5 research outputs found

    Uncertainty Quantification in Emission Quantitative Imaging

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    Imaging detectors have potential to improve the reliability of plutonium holdup measurements. Holdup measurement is a significant challenge for nuclear safeguards and criticality safety. To infer holdup mass today, inspectors must combine data from counting (non-imaging) detectors with spatial measurements, process knowledge, and survey estimates. This process results in limited certainty about the holdup mass. Imaging detectors provide more information about the spatial distribution of the source, increasing certainty. In this dissertation we focus on the emission quantitative imaging problem using a fast-neutron coded aperture detector. We seek a reliable way to infer the total intensity of a neutron source with an unknown spatial distribution. The source intensity can be combined with other measurements to infer the holdup mass. To do this we first create and validate a model of the imager. This model solves the forward problem of estimating data given a known source distribution. We use cross-validation to show that the model reliably predicts new measurements (with predictable residuals). We then demonstrate a non-Bayesian approach to process new imager data. The approach solves the inverse problem of inferring source intensity, given various sources of information (imager data, physical constraints) and uncertainty (measurement noise, modeling error, absence of information, etc). Bayesian approaches are also considered, but preliminary findings indicate the need for advanced Markov chain algorithms beyond the scope of this dissertation. The non-Bayesian results reliably provide confidence intervals for medium-scale problems, as demonstrated using a blind-inspector measurement. However, the confidence interval is quite large, due chiefly to modeling error.PHDNuclear Engineering & Radiological SciencesUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/136929/1/ambevill_1.pd

    Random Inspection Planning for Misuse Detection in Safeguards

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    The IAEA uses random inspections (RIs) to, inter alia, provide credible assurance that declared nuclear facilities are not used for undeclared purposes. These inspections are random in the sense that they are scheduled randomly in date and time, with short notice given to the inspected site. The IAEA has interest in employing statistical models for RI planning that take advantage of any potential efficiency gains while maintaining a high level of effectiveness.This paper first introduces the model parameters that are necessary for a quantitative analysis of RI models for misuse inspections (subsequently referred to as RI models) and discusses their importance. Then, using the model parameters, the set of all RI models is introduced, and three example RI models are presented. Next, for any RI model the probability is derived that any facility is selected at least once per year for an RI, and – regarding the objective of an RI – the probability that a misuse is detected within days after its start, where the parameter is the duration of misuse signatures at the facility. Next, the question is addressed which RI model should be chosen for RI planning: If no further constraints from the IAEA are imposed on the RI models (e.g., maximum unpredictability of the number of RIs in each year, resource constraints leading to an upper number of RIs, etc.), then the RI model that maximizes the achieved detection probability for a given set of input parameters should be selected. This maximization problem, however, is by no means trivial, because the maximization is performed over a set of RI models and not over a subset of real numbers.Finally, the functionality and features of the software prototype TRIPS (Tool for Random Inspection Planning in Safeguards) are demonstrated, and future work topics are highlighted
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